Will it be a Turning Point?
Rohan Gunaratna
The soundest strategy for neutralising a terrorist group is to target both its non military support and its operational structures. The JI support structures that are currently intact in Indonesia are their networks for disseminating propaganda, recruitment, fund-raising, procurement, safe houses, transport, communications, training and falsifying identities. JI’s operational structures include initial and final surveillance and reconnaissance, rehearsal and attack. Due to their lack of understanding of the threat, the Indonesian authorities’ focus is to target the operational and not the support and conceptual infrastructures. In many ways, the real fight against JI has not yet begun in Indonesia. Unless Jakarta recognises the need for appropriate and immediate action and far reaching measures, the country is likely to suffer further from terrorism.
Review of Counter-Terrorist Policy and Strategy
To reduce the threat to both Indonesia and the region as a whole, the leaders in Jakarta must consider three issues.
First, JI is still a legal organisation in Indonesia. It is not a criminal offence in Indonesia to be a member of JI. It is legitimate for Indonesians and foreigners to disseminate propaganda, recruit, raise funds, procure supplies and engage in other support functions for JI. If Indonesia is serious in fighting terrorism, it must proscribe JI as a terrorist group and dismantle both its support and operational infrastructure. For instance, the MMI is also led by Abu Bakar Bashir, is gaining a significant number of recruits, raising funds and engaging in other forms of support for JI. Without building a robust counter-terrorist legislative framework, many JI leaders and members, including its supremo Abu Bakar Bashir, will go free in the coming months.
Second, Indonesia’s intelligence services and police are seriously lacking a specialist counter-terrorism structure. The Indonesian police is primarily using its Criminal Investigation Division to fight terrorism. As terrorism is a vicious by-product of extremism, Jakarta must create an organisation dedicated to fighting both terrorism and extremism. Although there have been significant arrests, there are over 400 Afghan- and Moro-trained JI members still at large in Indonesia. As long as the masterminds behind the attack, Dr Azahari Hussein and Noordin Mohommed Top, remain free, it is likely that JI will mount another attack in the immediate future. 3
Third, the threat of jihadism is spreading in Indonesia. Although less than 1% of Indonesians actively support terrorism, it is a threat that is growing day by day. As groups that engage in political violence do not require any large-scale support, they can count on sufficient aid in Indonesia to sustain a successful terrorist campaign in the foreseeable future. As JI is actively recruiting from other Jihad groups, it will be a mistake for the government to focus exclusively on it. Rather than treating the terrorist threat as a purely JI
Area: International Terrorism - ARI Nº 125/2005 13/10/2005
problem, it will be necessary for the government to increase its intelligence coverage of like-minded groups. For instance, the Australian Embassy bomber Heri Golun was a member of Negara Islam Indonesia (from West Java). Furthermore, JI is penetrating both mainstream and Islamic political parties. To counter a regional trend in favour of Islamic militancy, the government must work with religious and educational leaders. A norm and an ethic must be built up in society against groups that advocate violence to achieve a political goal. JI and like-minded groups must be exposed as non-Koranic. The government has not invested in building up a structure to challenge the rise of jihadism in Indonesia.
International Response
The rise of terrorist and extremist networks in Indonesia is due to domestic and global developments. While some Jihadists want to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia, a smaller number of Jihadists want to establish an Islamic caliphate in the region. Increasingly, many Indonesian Jihadists are driven by the international environment. Some even want to go to Iraq to fight the Americans. Jihadist groups in Indonesia are not a monolith but JI ideology is increasingly bringing at least some of the groups together to work on a common platform. The US invasion of Iraq has not reduced but rather increased the threat of extremism and terrorism in Indonesia and in the region.
Today, the world is not fighting well-defined and tightly-structured groups but loosely-organised non-hierarchical networks. As borders become ever more porous, there is an increasing flow of ideas, personnel and resources across countries, regions and continents. Like any other country in South-east Asia, Indonesia itself cannot fight terrorism on its own. Today, terrorism’s centre of gravity in South-east Asia is in the Southern Philippines, where terrorist training camps are still intact, and in Indonesia, where terrorist ideologues recruit members to join a dozen jihadist groups including JI. Although the bulk of Indonesians actively oppose terrorism and extremism, support for jihadism is growing at a considerable pace.
As terrorist and extremist networks in Indonesia are externally funded and instigated, the burden of fighting them must be shared by the governments in the region and beyond. While counter-terrorist cooperation between ASEAN countries has increased since Bali I, the right type of counter-terrorist assistance to affected states –Indonesia and the Philippines– is still inadequate. Nevertheless, open and covert assistance from external partners –Australia, Japan and the US– has helped.
In response to Bali, where Australia lost 88 of its citizens, Canberra developed a prudent offshore counter-terrorist policy. A key component of this policy has been the offer of sustained support to build robust counter-terrorist capacity and capability in Indonesia. The bulk of this assistance has been used to train the Indonesian police at the tactical and operational levels. Through the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) in Semarang, the Australian Federal Police and the Indonesian police have jointly trained several thousand police officers, intelligence personnel and other Indonesians to fight terrorism. JCLEC counter-terrorism training assistance has helped to significantly reduce the threat to Indonesia. But as Indonesia is a vast country, a investment in counter-terrorist capacity and capability building is required, especially outside Java. 4
In visits to Poso and Maluku in August and September 2005 allowed the author to confirm that there were no specialist counter-terrorist units in these two conflict zones, where JI is
Area: International Terrorism - ARI Nº 125/2005 13/10/2005
operating in strength. The police were using their general- and serious-crime units to fight terrorism. Although the provincial police in Maluku is highly committed to fighting terrorism, it lacks the training and resources. To build up skills, expertise and technology, counter-terrorist assistance must be provided throughout Indonesia and not only in Java. Had Jakarta invested in resources throughout Indonesia, there would have been a possibility that Bali II would have been detected in the pre-launch or launch phases.
In addition to continuing to build up Indonesia’s tactical capability, Australia, the US, Japan and other countries in the region must seek to build up its strategic capability to fight terrorism. As Australia is Indonesia’s most reliable and closest partner, the first step should be for Australia to assist Indonesia in getting its counter-terrorism legislation right. Due to the pressure from civil liberties and human rights groups, Australia itself has been too slow in developing the appropriate legislation to manage the terrorist threat. However, as Australia has suffered as much as Indonesia as a direct result of terrorism, its political leaders and officials must work even more closely with their counterparts in Jakarta to legally criminalise JI. By building such a strategic counter-terrorist capability in Indonesia, the police and the intelligence community in the country will be able to perform their missions more effectively. Tactical counter-terrorist forces, such as Detachment 88, are only as good as the legal powers they are given. Indonesia’s listing or proscription of JI as a terrorist or illegal group will strengthen the hand of the government leaders and organisations that have the task of dismantling and destroying JI and its associate groups.
The Future of JI
Despite key losses, JI’s intention and capability to strike Western targets in Indonesia and overseas will remain intact in Indonesia in the immediate (one-two years) and mid-term (five years). JI itself has morphed and grown into a movement. More than ever before, JI is working with like-minded groups. The composition of a meeting JI leaders hosted in Java in early September 2005 reflected the new face of terror.
JI has also developed strategic depth in conflict zones where it is keen to revive sectarian violence. JI and its associate groups maintain a robust presence in three conflict zones: Mindanao in the Philippines and Maluku and Poso in Indonesia. Indonesia’s fight against JI’s organisation in these zones both at an ideological and operational level has yet to begin seriously. Unless the Indonesian leadership invests significantly in developing a comprehensive and robust counter-terrorist agenda beyond Java, JI will survive and strike back. Another attack in the coming months is likely to humiliate the government and embarrass the Indonesian President even more.
Conclusions: Bali I was a turning point. In early 2001, when regional governments presented Indonesia with irrefutable intelligence that a strong terrorist network was operating in Indonesia, the then Indonesian President Megawati refused to act. Many Indonesian officials smiled and said there were no terrorists in Indonesia! Had Indonesia acted in a timely fashion the lives of 202 Indonesian and foreign nationals could have been saved. But the Indonesian response after Bali was decisive, although not firm enough. The JI leader Abu Bakar Bashir was arrested only after Bali I but he is due to be released shortly! 5
Will Bali II make Indonesia take a longer view of the threat it is facing? Will Indonesian national leaders be willing to put aside their personal and political interests to advance
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long-term national and strategic gains? Has Indonesia now suffered enough to move forward in a serious and sustained manner to dismantle JI and its associate networks? 6
Terrorism is a serious business! There is no appeasement with the terrorists. The threat of terrorism must be intelligently and seriously managed.
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