Will it be a Turning Point?
Rohan Gunaratna
Theme : This ARI reviews the measures being taken, in addition to those that ought to be adopted, for Indonesia to develop a satisfactory response to the threat of Islamist terrorism following the bomb attack in Bali on 1 October 2005.
Summary: The Indonesian response after the first terrorist incident in Bali in 2002 was decisive although not firm enough. Despite the fact that there was no lack of intelligence material before the second terrorist attack i
n Bali, perpetrated on 1 October 2005, the Indonesian authorities failed to respond adequately to the threat. The success in preventing a terrorist attack is the best test to gauge whether a counter-terrorist strategy is functional or not. Bali II signalled Indonesia’s lack of understanding of the threat and the government’s inability to develop a comprehensive strategy to fight a rapidly growing jihad movement in the country. The Bali II attack also demonstrated Indonesia’s continuing lack of counter-terrorist leadership and its failure to invest in developing the appropriate legislation, training and intelligence. This ARI reviews the measures being taken, in addition to those that ought to be adopted, for Indonesia to develop a satisfactory response to the threat of Islamist terrorism. Will Bali II be another turning point?
Analysis:
The Bombing Season
On 1 October 2005 three suicide bombers of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) again struck at two sea-food cafés in Jimbaran beach resort and at a three-story noodle and steak house in downtown Kuta, Bali, Indonesia’s most popular tourist destination, on a Saturday night. Although the attack this time was less lethal, killing 22 and maiming and injuring 104, it was a repeat of the 12 October 2002 attack that killed 202 tourists and nationals and maimed and injured 200.
Among the regional law enforcement and intelligence community the months from August to December are identified as the ‘bombing season’. Other JI attacks in Indonesia during this period include those on the Philippine Ambassador’s residence in Jakarta (1 August 2000), on 11 churches (25 December 2000), Bali I (12 October 2002), on the Jakarta Marriot (5 August 2000) and on the Australian Embassy (9 September 2004). After each attack and the government’s reaction, JI took about a year to recover, plan, prepare and strike again. As the threat is more widespread today, this classic JI operational cycle may not be as predictable the next time.
Head of Terrorism Research at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, and author of ‘Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror’ (Columbia University Press, New York)
1 Area: International Terrorism - ARI No 125/2005 13/10/2005
Intelligence Failure or Operational Failure?
Every successful terrorist attack is a failure of intelligence. But in the case of Bali II, was it an intelligence failure or an operational failure? As there was intelligence that an attack was imminent, was there an operational failure on the part of the Indonesian authorities to act?
In the three months preceding Bali II, there was an abundance of general or strategic intelligence that a western target in Indonesia would be attacked during the period. There was no specific or tactical intelligence that Bali was to be attacked in October 2005. Hence, the focus of the Indonesian authorities was to prevent an attack in Jakarta, the most likely target location. Ideally, the Indonesian police and the intelligence community should have used this foreknowledge to develop their contact intelligence on the ground to prevent an incident like Bali II.
Unlike political, diplomatic and military targets, tourist and economic targets are too numerous to protect. By investing in target hardening alone, Bali II could not have been prevented. The sound strategy for fighting terrorism is to proactively disrupt terrorist plans and preparations in the making, not reactively conducting brilliant post-blast investigations. After JI attacked the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in September 2004, the Indonesian authorities, working with their Australian counterparts, conducted an impressive post-event investigation. A number of potential suicide bombers were arrested, terrorist safe houses neutralised and a large quality of terrorist material was recovered. Even in the case of Bali II, it is just a question of time before the Indonesian authorities identify the suicide bombers, their recruiters and facilitators and the safe houses used for the operation.
In the case of Bali II, there was no intelligence failure. It is very rarely that governments are able to develop precise tactical intelligence as to the venue and the time of an attack. What is clear is that in the lead-up to Bali II there was an operational failure, ie, a failure to act. The Indonesian authorities were not sufficiently focused on the real threat. By failing to penetrate the terrorist network, the Indonesian authorities were unable to develop tactical intelligence from the strategic intelligence they had received indicating that a terrorist operation was in the making. But to develop such effective operational practices, Indonesia must have a dedicated counter-terrorist leadership, structure and doctrine and a specialist counter-terrorist intelligence wing with the exclusive task of recruiting and infiltrating both JI’s core and its periphery. The Indonesian government has no such organisation.
Counter-Terrorist Strategy
Has Indonesia developed a national counter-terrorist policy, a strategy and a plan to reduce the threat of terrorism and extremism? Is Indonesia’s counter-terrorist strategy working on the ground? The success in preventing a terrorist attack is the best test to gauge whether a counter-terrorist strategy is functional or not. Bali II signalled Indonesia’s lack of understanding of the threat and the government’s inability to develop a comprehensive strategy to fight a rapidly growing jihad movement in the country. The Bali II attack also demonstrated Indonesia’s continuing lack of counter-terrorist leadership and its failure to invest in developing the appropriate legislation, training and intelligence. 2
Three years after the Indonesian government started to fight JI, the terrorist group still remains a credible threat. Until the deadly attack in October 2002, Jakarta denied the Area: International Terrorism - ARI No 125/2005 13/10/2005 presence of JI on its soil. Despite an attack every year since Bali I, the Indonesian government’s strategy to combat JI continues to be flawed. What are JI’s real strengths and the weaknesses of the government’s strategy? First, by penetrating like-minded groups during the past five years, JI has developed strategic depth. A fractured JI is operating by co-option and regeneration. JI has even created front organisations to survive. The existence of the Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Mujahidin Council of Indonesia), the public face of JI, is a case in point. Secondly, Indonesia is targeting only JI members that have been involved in violent action or that are about to engage in violence. Terrorism can never be opposed successfully by only targeting terrorist operational or attack cells.
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